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Blogging: A Journal Need Not a 
Journalist Make 
Anne Flanagan* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the status of “blogs” and “bloggers” as 
journalists in the context of journalistic privilege and other 
exceptions to legal obligations under U.S. and U.K. laws designed 
to accommodate freedom of expression.  Before that, however, it 
looks briefly at this fairly recent phenomenon that has emerged in 
the still somewhat freewheeling culture of the Internet.  This 
discussion is intended to show that the great number, variety and 
often participatory, unedited and sometimes ill-considered content 
of blogs challenges traditional notions of journalism.  Despite its 
foibles, this new medium of expression has growing import and 
possible significance for the future of how news and ideas are 
disseminated.  As this may blur the lines between traditional 
journalists and bloggers, this article considers what meaningful 
criteria can be used to ensure that the legal protections accorded to 
journalists so that the public can receive news and ideas are 
properly inclusive of blogs and bloggers.  It concludes that the 
customary adherence to a meaningful professional standard or code 
of conduct can demonstrate the use of a journalistic process to 
 
* Visiting Scholar, Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of International 
Business Law and Lecturer of Communications Law, Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, Queen Mary, University of London. My thanks to Brooklyn Law School for its 
gracious welcome.  My particular thanks to Margaret Berger and Eric Easton for their 
helpful comments.  
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gather, verify and publish information, one criteria that has been 
suggested as the dividing line. 
I. BLOGS AND BLOGGERS 
Blogging is the act of writing or maintaining a “blog.”1  A web 
log or simply a blog, a portmanteau of ‘web’ and ‘log,’ is a website 
containing, at a minimum, posted entries often around a particular 
area of interest and that are typically time-stamped by blogging 
software.2  These posts are often, but not necessarily, in reverse 
chronological order, so that one would have to trace the thread of 
that topic back to the first posting.  Such a website would usually 
be accessible to any Internet user.3  As noted, there are blogs of 
many kinds and addressing many topics.  One blog directory lists 
‘politics,’ ‘music,’ ‘life,’ ‘art,’ ‘culture,’ ‘news,’ ‘technology,’ 
‘personal,’ ‘humor,’ ‘photography,’ ‘love,’ ‘sex,’ ‘movies’ and 
‘writing’ among the keywords that categorize its posted blog 
links.4  There are even blogs on blogs,5 which might be called 
‘metablogs’ in techie parlance. 
The growth of blog numbers is unquestionable.  One American 
research project has categorized blogs as a “key part of online 
culture,” noting that in 2004, some eight million Americans had 
created blogs.6  While the same report notes, however, that 62% of 
Americans were completely unfamiliar with blogs, a 58% increase 
in blog readership in the U.S. since 2004, indicates that more and 
more Americans are becoming familiar with this technology.7  Nor 
 
 1 However, a blog without original content that merely maintains links to others is 
referred to as a ‘splog’, a combination of ‘spam’ and ‘blog’. Wikipedia, ‘List of blogging 
terms’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_blogging_terms (last visited February 1, 
2006). 
 2 Wikipedia, ‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (emphasis in original) 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2005). 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Blogwise, ‘Blogs by Keyword’, http://www.blogwise.com (last visited February 
1, 2006). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Data Memo from PIP Director Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & American Life Project, 
The State of Blogging (Jan. 2, 2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/PIP_blogging_data.pdf. 
 7 Id. 
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are blogs merely a domestic trend.  There are estimated to be over 
13 million blogs in China.8  Indeed, their entrenchment in the 
Internet culture is further marked by the fact a blogger’s lexicon 
has developed.9 
Blogs are a potentially unlimited publication format.  They are 
often characterized by casualness and unedited dialog akin to 
chatting with those familiar to you.10  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that some bloggers have run afoul of legal rules and corporate 
cultures.  For example, one online report ascribes the firings of 
several employees of United States companies to the content of 
their blogs.11  Purportedly, one was fired after publishing a 
“suggestive” photo of herself in her Delta Airline attendant’s 
uniform;12 another after gossiping about the behavior at her 
company’s Christmas party.13  Even cutting-edge companies seem 
no more progressive in their attitudes to the unedited nature of 
these new fora. Reportedly, Google terminated an employee for 
ruminating online about its finances14 and a Microsoft employee 
lost his job after publishing on his website a photo of Apple 
computers on a Microsoft loading dock, seemingly a security 
violation.15  These and other reports16 make clear only that some 
companies have little sense of humor when it comes to blog 
postings and their corporate image.  The risk to some bloggers 
does not seem to have seriously deterred their use by others, 
however. 
 
 8 See Howard W. French, Letter from China: Despite Web Crackdown, Prevailing 
Winds Are Free, NY Times, Feb. 9, 2006 at A4. 
 9 Wikipedia, ‘List of blogging terms’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_blogging_terms (last visited February 1, 2006). 
 10 See Steve Outing, The 11 Layers of Citizen Journalism, POYNTERONLINE, June 15, 
2005, http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=83126 (noting that “[w]hat 
people write goes on [the unedited news blogs]: blemishes, misspellings and all”). 
 11 See Anick Jesdanun, Blog-Related Firings Focus on Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 
2005, at B12. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Jeremy Blachman, Job Posting, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 8, 2005, at A19, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/opinion/31blachman.html?th&emc=th. 
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Many blogs are still perceived as, and are in fact, mere 
personal diaries or observations, or, indeed, even ideological rants.  
Others, however, have edged notably toward the boundaries of 
traditional media or served its function as sources of information.  
For example, blogs have provided valuable checks on mainstream 
press,17 comprised alternatives to government-restricted media 
outlets18 or have gained mainstream institutional recognition.19  
Illustrative here are the issuance of White House press credentials 
to a blogger,20 the recent citation by the United States Supreme 
Court to a law blog (or ‘blawg’)21 and the numerous notations of 
the growing role of ‘citizen journalists’ as news sources (such as 
the posting of photos and news reports by soldiers fighting in 
Iraq).22  In fact, traditional media outlets now have their own blogs.  
This institutional lowering of barriers to this medium may be a 
natural consequence of its growth and use by many.  This is 
despite the cultural rejection by those who consider their very 
distinction from the mainstream to be the hallmark of a blogger.  
The drift by numerous blogs toward traditional media has led to 
efforts to define blogging’s standards, including ethical and other 
 
 17 Wikipedia, ‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29, 
2005) (noting that within 72 hours of the 60 Minutes II report that caused Dan Rather to 
resign from CBS News, conservative bloggers had built a case that documents shown 
during the report were likely forgeries). 
 18 See Howard W. French, Letter from China: Despite Web Crackdown, Prevailing 
Winds Are Free, NY Times, Feb. 9, 2006 at A4. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Katherine Seelye, White House Approves Press Pass for Blogger, NY TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2005, at C5 (noting the credentialing of FishbowlDC published by 
Mediabistro.com). 
 21 See United States. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 775 n.4 (2005) (Stevens, J. dissent) 
(citing unpublished memoradum by Christopher A Wray, Assistant Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Guidance Regarding The Application Of Blakely v. 
Washington, 2004 WL 1402697 (June 24, 2004) To All Pending Cases, available at 
Sentencing Law and Policy: A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/chris_wray_doj_memo.p
df). 
 22 See, e.g., S. Outing, The 11 Layers of the Citizen Journalist, Poynter Online, June 15, 
2005, available at http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=83126; S. Rubel, 
Citizen Journalist Chronicles SF Explosion, Micro Persuasion, Aug. 19, 2005, available 
at http://www.micropersuasion.com/2005/08/citizen_journal.html.  See also Wikipedia, 
‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29, 2005). 
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boundaries as this Internet medium of expression evolves and 
matures.23 
II. THE BLOGGER AS JOURNALIST? 
One evolutionary boundary poses a potentially difficult 
question: is a blogger a journalist under the law?  This is not a 
theoretical issue.  It is one that has recently been considered in 
several contexts in the United States and that could present a 
quandary for Congress in the near future.  The first of these was 
the consideration by the Federal Election Commission in its rule-
making process of whether blogs are entitled to the “media 
exemption” from corporate spending limits under the federal 
campaign finance laws.24  The issue similarly arose with assertion 
of the journalistic privilege by several blog authors in opposition to 
a subpoena by Apple Corporation in California to compel an 
Internet service provider (ISP) to disclose the sources of leaked 
information regarding unreleased Apple products.25  This is a 
scenario that may test traditional “freedom of the press” rights26 
and the scope of journalist privileges under the First Amendment.  
It would also test state-based “shield” laws, which were enacted in 
response to a perceived lack of protection for journalist 
information sources under the Constitution.27  The underlying 
question of the qualification of a journalist under the law in this era 
 
 23 See, e.g., Blogger’s Code of Ethics, Cyberjournalist.net, available at 
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?page_id=3 (noting that it is based on the Society of 
Professional Journalists Code of Ethics) (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).  The code, however, 
does not reference the use of confidential sources or the ethical obligation to keep any 
promise made to confidential sources. See id. 
 24 See infra Part II A. 
 25 See infra Part II. B. 
 26 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth: Judge Alex 
Kozinski and the Freedoms of Speech and Press, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 257, 273 
(2004).  In considering issues surrounding the scope of press freedoms raised by one 
technology, the Internet, it is interesting to note the historical fact that the expression 
‘freedom of the press’ arises from another technology, the printing press which involved 
the ‘pressing’ ink on paper via a manual process and which is suggested to have taken its 
name from yet another technology, a wine ‘press’ which it resembled.  This technology 
has long been obsolete despite the residual use of the word. 
 27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (8th ed. 2004). 
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of ubiquitous online publication also has context under the United 
Kingdom laws that accord special privileges to protect freedom of 
expression.28  The following first explores the issues under the 
Federal Election laws and the journalistic privileges under the First 
Amendment and state “shield” laws. It then addresses how the 
question of whether bloggers are journalists might be answered. It 
does this in the context of the journalistic exception from 
numerous obligations placed on controllers of personal data under 
the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 199829 and the 
qualified privilege against defamation.30 
A. The Election Law Media Exemption and Bloggers 
The consideration by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
in its rule-making process of whether blogs are entitled to the 
“media exemption” from corporate spending limits under the 
federal campaign finance laws arises from Shays v. FEC.31  In this 
case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
ordered the FEC to revise its rules issued in implementing the 
McCain-Feingold campaign finance reforms.32  The Shays court 
held, among other things, that the term “public communication” 
should include some communications over the Internet which the 
FEC rules had impermissibly fully exempted.33  Federal campaign 
finance laws define “public communication” to be “a 
communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, 
mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other 
form of general public political advertising.”34  Even though 
“Internet communications” is not specifically listed, the court 
 
 28 See generally Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 1 (Eng.) (regulating the processing 
of information relating to individuals, including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure 
of such information). 
 29 Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29 (Eng.). 
 30 See infra Part IV B. 
 31 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, No. 04–5352, 2005 WL 1653053 (D.C. Cir. 
July 15, 2005). 
 32 Id. at 65, 67–71 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 65. 
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found that some Internet communications clearly fall within the 
category of “general public political advertising.”35 
This definition of “public communication” is important.  It 
triggers certain funding limits and funding-source disclosure 
obligations called ‘disclaimers.’  Political parties and committees 
are restricted to the expenditure of delimited federal campaign 
funds on public communications that promote, attack, support or 
oppose (PASOs) any candidate for federal office.36  The laws also 
limit contributions that corporations and labor unions can spend on 
certain activities in connection with federal elections, including 
PASOs, unless done through separately financed political action 
committees (“PACs”).37  PACs are also regulated by reporting and 
other requirements.38  Following Shays, various Internet 
communications will as well be subject to the funding limitations 
under revised rules that must be issued by the FEC. 
The corporate funding limitations for public communications 
do not, however, apply to media corporations39 such as Fox, the 
New York Times or the Washington Post.  This is pursuant to a 
“media exemption” provided for under the laws regarding 
“contributions” which states that 
[a]ny cost incurred in covering or carrying a news story, 
commentary, or editorial by any broadcasting station 
(including a cable television operator, programmer or 
producer), newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication is not a contribution unless the facility is owned 
or controlled by any political party, political committee, or 
candidate . . . .40 
This means that media corporations can endorse or support a 
candidate as and to the extent they choose.41 
 
 35 Id. at 67–69. 
 36 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2002); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24(b)(3), 300.13(a), 
300.32(a)(1)–(2); 300.36(a)(1) (2005). 
 37 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003). 
 38 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 39 11 C.F.R. § 100.73 (2005). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. 
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In attempting to comply with Shays, the FEC has proposed that 
only paid political Internet advertisements placed on another’s 
website be categorized as a communication that can trigger “the 
contribution regulation.”42  If this proposal is followed, most 
Internet communications would continue to be excluded from the 
definition of “public communications” for purposes of the 
contribution limits.43  In addition, the proposed rules would not 
implement a payment disclaimer requirement for bloggers, which 
would otherwise require bloggers to disclose the source that paid 
for their comments including political party or committee 
sources.44  However, the FEC does question (1) whether a blogger 
should be required to disclose payments if they expressly 
advocated “the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate;” 
and (2) whether “payment by a political committee to a blogger for 
promotional content on [a] blog constitute(s) ‘general political 
advertising.’”45 
The FEC’s proposal would extend the “media exemption” to 
encompass Internet media by clarifying that the list of media 
includes “other periodical publications” whether they appear in 
print or on the Internet.46  This extension hardly seems necessary 
given the extent of the continuing carve-outs for Internet 
communications.  The extended media list would encompass 
institutional media websites, even those with no offline presence. 
The FEC sought comments as to whether bloggers could fall 
within periodical publications and whether a blogger’s activity 
should be considered commentary or editorializing or news story 
activity.47  There is a concern that bloggers’ participation in the 
political process will be unduly restrained by unnecessary 
regulation.48  However, there is also a concern that unlimited 
 
 42 Internet Communic’ns, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,967, 16,970–71 (Apr. 4, 2005) (to be 
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110 and 114). 
 43 See generally id. 
 44 Id. at 16972–73. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 16974–75. 
 47 Id. at 16975. 
 48 See Letter of Deirdre K. Mulligan, Director, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public 
Policy Clinic, School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, Geoffrey Cowan, 
Dean, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California, and 
FLANAGAN 3/17/2006  10:57 AM 
2006] BLOGGING AND THE JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE 403 
carve-outs for blogs could erode the constraints intended by the 
recently-reformed campaign finance laws by permitting 
corporations and unions to give candidates unlimited contributions 
via the use of blogs.49  Final rules have yet to be promulgated.  
With its petition for a hearing by the full D.C. Circuit50 now 
denied, the FEC indicates that it now intends to proceed 
aggressively with the rule making. It expects the final rules to be 
promulgated by the end of February 2006.51  Thus, the limitations, 
if any, imposed on blogs qualifying as “media” under the federal 
election laws remain to be seen.  Such limitations, however, are 
unlikely to be stringent, given the FEC’s expressed concern that 
“commentary,” within the defined functions of exempt “media,” is 
intended to include third-party access to media outlets.52 
B. Bloggers and Journalistic Privilege 
The second development raising the issue of the legal status of 
bloggers as journalists emerges in the very complex, fractured and 
confusing world of United States law governing journalistic 
privilege.  Yet, its importance has been noted as threatening to the 
very existence of the privilege. This is because if anyone can create 
a blog and claim that his postings, no matter what their import, 
purpose, or content, amount to journalism, can any assert a 
privilege over others?53 A little background might prove helpful to 
 
Matthew Grossmann, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of 
California at Berkeley, to Brad C, Deutsch, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election 
Commission (June 1, 2005) (enclosing Report of the Bipartisan California Commission 
on Internet Political Practices), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/ 
nprm/internet_comm/comm_14.pdf.  See also Allison R. Hayward, “System Failure,” 
National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment Hayward2005 
11040830.asp. 
 49 See Amy Pike, Internet Hearing, 31(8) RECORD: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 2 
(Aug. 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2005/Aug05.pdf#page=2. 
 50 See Petition for Rehearing En Banc by the Federal Election Commission, Shays v. 
FEC, No. 04-5253 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/shays_v_fec_petition_rehearing_en_banc_04_5352.pdf 
 51 See FEC Court Case Abstracts, Shays v. FEC, Petition for Rehearing En Banc 
Denied, available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_S.shtml#shays_02. 
 52 See Internet Communic’ns, 70 Fed. Reg. 16967, 16974-75 (Apr. 4, 2005) (to be 
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110 and 114). 
 53 See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to 
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUSTON L. 
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understand the California shield laws and to show why the status 
of bloggers as journalists will not easily be definitively resolved. 
Many legal scholars contend that the Supreme Court, in 
Branzburg v. Hayes,54 recognized the existence of a limited 
privilege under the First Amendment allowing the press to refuse 
to disclose confidential source information, though such a privilege 
was not expressed in the terms of the First Amendment.55  This 
contested view56 points to a majority mustered from the four 
dissenting and one concurring justices that a qualified privilege 
exists.57 
However, the decision itself concluded that journalist witnesses 
to a crime were not privileged from testifying before a grand jury 
despite any confidentiality agreement into which they might have 
entered.58  Thus, the scope and application of journalistic privilege 
can vary according to its source.  Where sought pursuant to the 
qualified privilege of the First Amendment, courts usually 
determine its application on a case-by-case basis balancing “vital 
societal and constitutional interests.”59  The scope of the privilege 
can vary due to the application of different balancing tests by 
different courts.  The tests, however, usually at least require a 
showing that (1) the information is material and relevant to the 
claim; (2) the information is necessary to the maintenance of the 
claim; and (3) other potential sources for the information have 
 
REV. 1371, 1406–16 (2002–2003) (urging that the methods in which professional 
journalists gather, verify and disseminate information should be the test of the 
qualification of a ‘journalist’ rather than any institutional or content analysis). 
 54 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 55 See, e.g., Brief for the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of Press, et. al as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, O’Grady v. Superior Ct. of the State of Cal., County of 
Santa Clara, at 8 (Apr. 7, 2005) (No. H028579), available at 
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_v_Does/20050407_apple_brief.pdf [hereinafter 
Amici Curiae Brief]. 
 56 See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access and the First Amendment, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (contending that this privilege has instead been afforded to 
parties by the lower courts despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to do so in its decision 
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). 
 57 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 55, at 8. 
 58 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (noting expressly that the issue of confidential sources 
was not before it). 
 59 Id. at 710 (Powell J. concurring). 
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been exhausted.60  Some tests also consider whether the person is a 
journalist and a party to the action61 and/or the nature of public 
interest protected in publishing the information.62 The 
jurisdictional variation in the scope of the privilege is significant. 
Not only do the courts of the eleven federal circuits and a majority 
of state courts decide the nature and scope of the privilege in 
accordance with the First Amendment63 but also under individual 
state constitutions64 or the common law65 where applicable. 
Complexity is further compounded by the fact that thirty-one states 
have enacted “shield” laws protecting journalists, inter alia, from 
liability for civil and criminal contempt.66  These laws give varying 
levels of protection.67 California, for example, has recognized a 
First Amendment qualified privilege68 and a statutory protection 
for journalists, that is now also enshrined in its state constitution.69  
The variation in protection under case law and state statutes across 
jurisdictions ranges from mere protection against the disclosure of 
confidential sources to the protection of all unpublished 
materials—whether or not confidential.70  There is no federal 
statutory privilege of non-disclosure71 to enhance the limitations of 
the constitutional protection.72  A federal statutory privilege has 
been urged in light of the jailing of a journalist from the New York 
Times in October 2004 in a politically charged case for her refusal 
 
 60 James C. Goodale, et al., Reporter’s Privilege, 580 PRAC. L. INST., PAT., COPYRIGHT, 
TRADEMARK, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 27, 58 (1999). 
 61 Id. at 70, 72. 
 62 See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 63 State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502 (N.H. 1982). 
 64 Id. at 503. 
 65 Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Wash. 1981). 
 66 Berger, supra note 53, at 1392. 
 67 But not necessarily more full protection. See O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Inc., 71 
N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (decision under New York State and U.S. Federal Constitutions for 
recognition of qualified privilege in journalist’s photographs that did not fall within 
absolute privilege of confidential sources and information under New York’s shield law, 
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79–h (Supp. 2006).) 
 68 Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 629–30 (Cal. 1984). 
 69 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b). 
 70 Goodale, et al., supra note 60, at 46–47. 
 71 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000).  There is a federal statutory protection from the 
search and seizure of certain ‘work product’ and ‘documentary materials’ unless a listed 
exemption applies.  This statute applies to persons. 
 72 See Berger, supra note 53, at 1384–86 nn. 57–70, and accompanying text. 
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to reveal a source of information about which she never wrote an 
article.73  The effort behind a federal statutory provision for 
protection of journalists is not likely to succeed under the current 
administration and Congress.  However, identical bills have been 
introduced in the House and Senate74 and have been endorsed by 
parties with clout, including the American Bar Association. These 
bills, however, apply to a “covered person” defined as: 
A) an entity that disseminates information by print, 
broadcast, cable, satellite, mechanical, photographic, 
electronic, or other means and that— 
(i) publishes a newspaper, book, magazine, or other 
periodical; 
(ii) operates a radio or television broadcast station (or 
network of such stations), cable system, or satellite 
carrier, or a channel or programming service for any 
such station, network, system, or carrier; or 
(iii) operates a news agency or wire service; 
B) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such an entity; or 
C) an employee, contractor, or other person who gathers, 
edits, photographs, records, prepares, or disseminates news 
or information for such an entity.75 
The definition’s limitation to an “entity” and its parents, 
affiliates and employees and those working on its behalf precludes 
the extension of protection to blogs operated by individuals in 
accordance with general legal meaning of “entity.”76 The Senate 
bill’s co-sponsor, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has indicated 
that while the debate is not yet closed, bloggers would “‘probably 
not’” be considered “‘real journalists’”.77 He queried “‘how do you 
 
 73 Terry Frieden, New York Times Reporter Held in Contempt, CNN.COM, Oct. 7, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/07/miller.contempt. 
 74 See H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 75 H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 76 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004). 
 77 M. Fitzgerald, Shield Law Sponsor Lugar: Bloggers ‘Probably Not’ Considered 
Journos, Editor & Publisher, October 10, 2005, available at 
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determine who will be included in this bill?’”78 The Senator’s 
question might be answered if the Congress were to apply a 
journalistic process analysis or journalist function analysis.  This is 
a test that has been urged by some to determine appropriate 
limitations to be imposed, including in the Apple case79 discussed 
below.  It is, however, suggested that the practical application of 
such test should be based on the adherence to a professional code 
or standard that governs the gathering, verifying and dissemination 
of information.  These are, as noted, the necessary elements of the 
journalistic process performed by those considering themselves to 
be journalists.  Those customarily adhering to professional 
standards that address all of the processes would earn the right to 
claim journalistic privilege.  Such code or standard need not be that 
of a particular professional organization.  Rather, it might be that 
developed by the individual blogger or news organization80 as long 
as it had meaningful criteria for each aspect of the journalistic 
process.  How this might work is later explored in the context of 
UK law. 
1. The Apple Lawsuit 
Three online websites devoted to Apple Computer Corporation 
and its products, published several articles in late 2004 about 
products that Apple had not yet released.81  The articles included 
drawings and technical specifications apparently taken from a 
confidential Apple presentation.82  Apple filed suit in December, 
2004, against twenty-five unnamed parties (Does 1–25) alleging 
that the defendants had leaked trade secret information to three 
 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1500073/posts (reporting the Senator’s 
remarks to the Inter American Press Association). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1–04–CV–032178, 2005 WL 578641, *4 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct., Santa Clara County Mar. 11, 2005). 
 80 See, e.g., the “Ethical Journalism Guidelines” of the New York Times, available at 
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-coe.html. 
 81 Id. at *1. 
 82 Id. at *4. 
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websites.83  Reportedly, Apple believed the Does were Apple 
employees.84  Apple issued a subpoena to an ISP which provided 
email services to PowerPage, one of the websites, seeking 
disclosure of the contents and communications data for emails and 
postings to the website.85  The contents and communications data 
contains information about the identity of the source(s) that 
revealed the trade secret information.86  The website owners, yet 
non-parties to the Apple suit, moved for a protective order, 
asserting, inter alia, that this was confidential source information 
protected pursuant to the journalist privilege under the First 
Amendment and California’s shield laws.87 California’s shield 
laws are limited to non-parties to a suit, and could therefore 
theoretically apply.88 Apple, however, countered that as blogs, 
these websites were not entitled to assert the privilege in any 
event.89 
The California shield laws are incorporated into the California 
Constitution and section 1070 of its Evidence Code.  The wording 
of each provision is essentially identical.  The California 
constitutional provision, in relevant part, states: 
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or 
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person 
who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in 
contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any 
other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to 
disclose the source of any information procured while so 
 
 83 Dawn Kawamoto, Tentative Ruling Favors Apple in Blog Case, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Mar. 4, 2005, http://news.com.com/2163ative+ruling+favors+Apple+in+blog+case/2100-
1047_3-5599671.html. 
 84 Brad Gibson, TMO Exclusive—Apple Subpoenas Mac Rumor Sites Over Audio 
Product, THE MAC OBSERVER, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.macobserver.com/ 
article/2004/12/20.7.shtml. 
 85 Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at *1. 
 86 Id. at *2–4. 
 87 Id. at *4–5. 
 88 Id. at *6. 
 89 Brief for Apple Computer, Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Mandate and 
/or Prohibition, at 32-33, O’Grady v. Sup. Ct. of the State of Cal., County of Santa Clara 
(Apr. 7, 2005) (Civil No. H028579), available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/ 
Apple_v_Does/20050407_apple_opposition.pdf. 
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connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine 
or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any 
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, 
receiving or processing of information for communication to the 
public. 
Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person 
connected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any 
person who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in 
contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information 
procured while so connected or employed for news or news 
commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to 
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in 
gathering, receiving or processing of information for 
communication to the public. . . .90 
Although the Apple court noted the possible “blog” status in 
dicta,91 this was not the basis for its decision in Apple’s favor.  
Rather, the superior court assumed arguendo that the movants 
were journalists and ruled that the privilege did not apply to 
anyone who violated the California trade secret laws.92  The court 
stated that “[t]he California Legislature has not carved out any 
exception to these statutes for journalists, bloggers or anyone 
else.”93 However, the court then balanced the “undisputed right to 
protect intellectual property” embodied in California’s 
implementation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act94 (the “UTSA”) 
 
 90 CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b). 
 91 See Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *2 n.4. 
 92 Id. at *4–5. 
 93 Id. at *4. 
 94 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426 et. seq (West 1997).  It is possible that were the journalists 
sued themselves they could be found liable under this statute for misappropriation of 
trade secrets which encompasses disclosure under circumstances whether the reporter 
knew or should have known it was from one under a duty to keep it confidential. See id. 
at § 3426.1 (b)(1) (defining “Misappropriation”).  “Trade secret” is defined under Cal. 
Civ. Code § 3426.1 (d)(1) to mean: 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that:  
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and 
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and in its Penal Code,95 with the “free speech” claim “rife with 
complexities and restrictions” in light of the broad reach of 
possible discovery under the California procedural law.96  It 
concluded that Apple had met the necessary showing under the 
five-part balancing test outlined by the California Supreme Court 
in Mitchell v. Superior Court97 for weighing disclosure against the 
First Amendment privilege.98  The Apple court set out the test and 
its findings as follows: 
(1) “Nature of the litigation and whether the reporter is a 
party:” 
Although not yet named as defendants, it is certainly 
possible “journalists” may be; certainly Mr. O’Grady’s 
declaration suggests this possibility. 
 
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 
Id. at § 3426.1 (d)(1). 
 95 Cal. Penal Code § 499c (West 1999).  The relevant provisions of this section of the 
Code are as well fairly broad and may be found, should the authors themselves be sued, 
to encompass their disclosure. But, it is not as encompassing as the civil liability basis 
and will depend if the acceptance of the documents constituted unlawfully obtaining 
access or whether there was some inducement to the source to deliver the information. 
The relevant sections  provide that theft of “trade secret” comprises: 
(a)(3) Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, without authority 
makes or causes to be made a copy of any article representing a trade 
secret. . . . 
(c) Every person who promises, offers or gives, or conspires to promise or offer 
to give, to any present or former agent, employee or servant of another, a 
benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or 
otherwise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his 
or her present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not 
authorized by the owner to receive or acquire the trade secret and every present 
or former agent, employee, or servant, who solicits, accepts, receives or takes a 
benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or 
otherwise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his 
or her present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not 
authorized by the owner to receive or acquire the trade secret, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, 
or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($ 5,000), or by both that fine 
and imprisonment. 
Id. at § 499c(a)(3), (c). 
 96 Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *2. 
 97 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984). 
 98 Id. at 629–30. 
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(2) “Does discovery sought go to the heart of plaintiff’s 
claim:” 
Without this discovery Apple’s case will be crippled, since 
it will not know the defendants upon whom it should serve 
process. 
(3) “Have other sources of information been exhausted?” 
The moving parties maintain Apple should have done more 
investigating up to this point, including the unusual step of 
noticing the depositions of its own employees.  But the 
Court is convinced, upon reviewing Apple’s public and in 
camera materials that a thorough investigation has been 
done and all alternative means have been exhausted. 
(4)  “What is the public good served by protecting the 
misappropriation of trade secrets?” 
Movants did not present a persuasive reason of “public 
good” and never answered the Court’s inquiry as to why 
there was a true public benefit from disclosure.99 
Apple also met the fifth prong of the test which required a 
prima facie showing on the merits of misappropriation of trade 
secrets. 
The court then held that the California shield laws did not 
prevent the subpoena from issuing because the law did not grant a 
privilege to a reporter, if indeed Mr. Jason O’Grady, the owner of 
PowerPage, was a reporter.  Rather, the shield laws granted 
immunity from being held in contempt.100  However, the court held 
that shield laws were not a “license conferred on anyone to violate 
valid criminal laws.”101  Finally, the Apple court seemed to suggest 
 
 99 2005 WL 5786421 at *5–6 (citations omitted).  In a later discussion, the Court states 
that although much had been made of the public interest in Apple as a justification for the 
assertion of privilege, there is a clear distinction between the interests of the public in an 
‘iconic’ company such as Apple and disclosures in the public interest such as “the 
whistleblower who discloses a health, safety, or welfare hazard affecting all, or the 
government employee who reveals mismanagement or worse by our public officials.” Id. 
at *8.  Here, the Court reasoned, “the movants are doing nothing more than feeding the 
public’s insatiable desire for information.” Id. 
 100 Id. at *6. 
 101 Id. at *6–7. 
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that Mr. O’Grady himself was likely criminally liable for the 
unlawful acquisition and dissemination of the proprietary 
information.102 
The websites appealed the lower court’s decision, which 
essentially negates the application of journalist privilege where 
trade secret is alleged, to the California Appellate Court.  
Traditional media have filed briefs as amici curiae and refer to 
these authors only as journalists.103  Apple has raised on appeal the 
ability of bloggers to assert the privilege.104  This issue is one that 
may ultimately need to be decided if the Appellate Court conducts 
a de novo review based on all the facts and reverses on any basis.  
There seems to be some grounds for reversal.  The lower court 
spent considerable time asserting the primacy of First Amendment 
protection against prior restraint,105 which was not at issue in the 
case.  However, the lower court did not address the issue of the 
First Amendment interest regarding the qualified privilege of 
journalists to refuse to disclose confidential sources and 
unpublished information, which is essential to gathering news to 
inform the public.  The Mitchell court did address this issue, which 
is inherent in its balancing test.106  However, it is not clear that the 
Apple court properly applied the Mitchell test.  The owner of the 
PowerPage website is a non-party.  The court’s assertion that Mr. 
O’Grady’s status as a non-party could change107 does not alter his 
current status.  The balance of First Amendment and disclosure 
interests is different for non-parties.108  However, even as a party 
to the litigation, the privilege is not necessarily negated.109  The 
 
 102 Id. at *7. 
 103 See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 55. 
 104 Dennis Sellers, Mac Sites Appeal Judge’s Pro-Apple Ruling in Lawsuit, MACSIMUM 
NEWS: YOUR LEADING APPLE NEWS ALTERNATIVE (Mar. 23, 2005), 
http://www.macsimumnews.com/index.php/archive/mac_sites_appeal_judges_pro_apple
_ruling_in_lawsuit. 
 105 Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at *4–5. 
 106 Id. at *5–6. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 109 See id.  This case involving a leak of sealed government information alleged to 
comprise an invasion of privacy and on which the Mitchell court relied for the tests to be 
applied in determining balance between disclosure and privilege.  The Zerilli court held 
that ‘in all but the most exceptional cases’ disclosure should yield to privilege in civil 
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conclusion that disclosure was necessary because the information 
was unavailable through other sources is fairly peremptory and 
does not reflect the nature of the efforts that Apple did make.110  In 
determining whether other sources of the information are available, 
the courts, including the courts that authored the earlier federal 
decisions on which the Mitchell test is based, apply a fairly 
stringent test.111  The Mitchell decision makes clear that “all 
alternative sources” should be exhausted, including the deposing of 
numerous persons.112  In the Apple case, this would include, at 
least, the Apple employees who had access to the confidential 
information.  Whether such an investigation was conducted is 
unknown because the lower court based its decision in part on an 
in camera inspection of Apple materials.113  However, it appears 
unlikely that such an investigation was conducted.  Where 
constitutional protections are at stake, however, the factors for 
consideration in the balancing of the interests should be made 
clear. 
The Apple decision does not address the intersection of the 
journalist privilege and journalist use of contemporary 
communications instrumentalities, such as an ISP, as a media-
related source.  If the privilege attaches to one’s unpublished 
emails, should the courts permit the privilege to be bypassed 
through issuance of a subpoena for the contents and 
communications data from the non-privileged entity that holds the 
 
actions involving non-party journalists. Id. at 712.  Even in libel cases where the 
journalist was the party, “disclosure should by no means be automatic.” Id. at 714.  In 
Zerilli, the refusal to order the disclosure by the reporter of its source of illegally obtained 
and possibly illegally leaked information from an electronic surveillance, resulted in a 
summary judgment against the plaintiff. Id. at 715. 
 110 Although the Apple court was not specific about Apple’s efforts, it was “convinced, 
upon reviewing Apple’s public and in camera materials that a thorough investigation has 
been done and all alternative means have been exhausted.” Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at 
*6. 
 111 See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713–14; Baker v. F & F Investments, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d. 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). 
 112 See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 634 (Cal. 1984).  The Mitchell court 
did not directly state that numerous depositions were required to be taken, but did so by 
reference to Zerilli which stated that “an alternative requiring the taking of as many as 60 
depositions might be a reasonable prerequisite to compelled disclosure.” Zerilli, 656 F.2d 
at 714. 
 113 See Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *6. 
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data? This would undermine the policy underlying the First 
Amendment privilege and the shield law immunities. Their 
protections would be eroded and limited to face-to-face or written 
communications.  Therefore, all electronic communications 
leaving a digital trace that the communications provider holds 
would be excluded from protection. In addition, the Apple court 
seemingly concluded at the outset that there were no exceptions to 
the trade secret laws, even under the First Amendment.114  As 
California has concluded that the First Amendment requires 
recognition of such privilege, unless and until the U.S. Supreme 
Court says otherwise, a California state law cannot abrogate United 
States constitutional protections.115  Therefore, unless the 
balancing exercise the court performed is found to be properly 
applied, the decision cannot stand. 
If a court were ultimately required to decide whether these 
websites with blog attributes116 (hence, for these purposes, 
“blogs”) are entitled to protection under the California shield 
provisions, the court would have to look to various sources for 
guidance.  The wording and headings of the California shield laws 
are instructive.  Section 1070 (a) identifies a group of protected 
persons in “written” media based on their employment positions: 
“a publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or 
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person 
who has been so connected or employed.”117  In contrast, 
subsection (b) of section 1070 protects identified persons involved 
in broadcasting based on the nature of the industry in which they 
are employed.118  Subsection (b) applies to “a radio or television 
news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a 
radio or television station, or any person who has been so 
connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to 
 
 114 Id. at *4. 
 115 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In that event, California can still accord the greater 
protection under its own constitution’s version of the First Amendment. 
 116 See Wikipedia, ‘Weblog,’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29, 
2005); Apple Suits: Myth-Busting, EWEEK.COM, http://blog.ziffdavis.com/rothenberg/ 
archive/2005/03/17/6456.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2005). 
 117 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West 1995). 
 118 See id. § 1070(b). 
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disclose the source of any information procured while so connected 
or employed for news or news commentary purposes on radio or 
television.”119  This clearly excludes those in broadcasting whose 
function is providing mere entertainment rather than news or news 
commentary. 
The “news” limitation is reinforced by the headings of the 
statutory sections.  The protection is contained in the California 
Evidence Code section 1070, entitled “Refusal to disclose news 
source,” which is in Chapter 5, entitled “Immunity of Newsman 
from Citation for Contempt,” of Division 8, entitled “Privileges” of 
the Evidence Code.  This structure suggests a functional 
requirement that the protected person be engaged in news or news 
commentary under some evaluative standard that is possibly 
presumed to already govern newspapers, magazines, and periodical 
publications under subsection (a). 
III. JOURNALISTIC CODE OF ETHICS AS FUNCTIONAL TEST FOR 
JOURNALIST 
Although alternative tests have been proposed for 
distinguishing journalist bloggers from all other bloggers, Linda L. 
Berger, a legal scholar and former newsperson, has suggested an 
evaluative tool that seems worthy of consideration in her article 
“Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to 
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of 
Publication.”120  Noting that defining “news”‘ or “newsperson” is 
as unhelpful as defining “journalist,” she suggests that there is an 
objective process to legitimate journalism that seeks to gather, 
evaluate and disseminate truthful information to the public on a 
regular basis.121  Under a cost-benefit analysis, the use of such 
criteria as the threshold for protection is appropriate because it 
enhances “the free flow of information to the public while only 
slightly diminishing the accuracy and efficiency of judicial or 
governmental processes by allowing witnesses to withhold 
 
 119 Id. (emphasis added). 
 120 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 1371 (2002-2003). 
 121 Id. at 1411–16. 
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information.”122  In this way, neither job titles nor industry 
affiliations123  that are based on and limited to the status quo in a 
converging world of media platforms would control; nor would 
labels such as “blog”. Such functional criteria would not impose 
any prior restraints on the nature of the content that might impinge 
upon First Amendment concerns or require vague and theoretical 
distinctions to categorize the content as news, entertainment or a 
matter of public interest.124 
The test of public interest is one that is only determined in 
hindsight and, therefore, is not really helpful to the individuals or 
entities seeking to disseminate information within the protections 
that hinge on such a determination.  However, such a test, in many 
instances, seems unavoidable.  This is especially true where the 
nature of the information can give rise to a claim against the 
publication, such as defamation, invasion of privacy, or, as in 
Apple, a trade secrets action.  Under each of these types of claims, 
the court has to evaluate the content. If, however, the process by 
which it was gathered, evaluated, validated and disseminated 
conforms to a professional standard of journalism, it is likely to 
ultimately work against a finding on the merits.  For example, a 
valid defense in a defamation action is a showing that the allegedly 
defamatory statement is true.  Adherence to a journalist’s code of 
professionalism that required validation of information would tend 
to ensure truth. Further, knowledge on the part of the journalist that 
adherence to such code could trigger whatever journalistic 
protections were available would not only serve to provide 
advance guidance but also to encourage such adherence. 
Moreover, examining the public interest protected in that 
publication or newsgathering and balancing it against the 
competing interest of disclosure of the source of that news seems 
necessary to determine which is more worthy of protection in that 
case.  This is especially when other important societal interests are 
at stake, such as another civil or human right.  So, rather than hold 
that a qualified privilege attains merely because a person can show 
 
 122 Id. at 1374. 
 123 She notes that a proposal for a model shield law would require specific connections 
to “established media.” Id. at 1408–09. 
 124 Id. at 1409–12. 
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status as a journalist because (1) either (a)  adhere to a code of 
ethics or (b) they gather news routinely and (2) because any 
information they publish is subject to an editorial process and 
philosophy, and thus the content is not unsubstantiated “gossip, 
nonsense or disinformation” unprotected by shield laws,125 the 
better course would include the process evaluation to determine ab 
initio whether a person is a journalist entitled to claim privilege.  A 
further weighting, and possibly even a presumption, of the 
importance of the free speech interest could be attained by the 
defendant once the defendant had proven the professionalism of 
the process.  Only an interest of countervailing weight could 
overcome this presumption, which would be determined by an 
examination of the circumstances of the case.  The data protection 
laws of the United Kingdom provide one example of such 
balancing.126  These exempt journalists from many of the duties 
otherwise imposed on the controllers of personal data in the 
interest of freedom of expression.  Of course, in circumstances 
where the privilege is absolute and based on status as journalist, 
evidence of customary adherence to a professional code of 
journalistic ethics would be compelling proof of having performed 
the function of a ‘real’ journalist.  It would be largely irrelevant 
whether this was a member of a professional journalist society, an 
employee subject to an employment code by a media organization 
that has identified its own ethical criteria or as an individual 
blogger who has chosen to identify and follow such standards. 
IV. THE JOURNALIST  IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
How a code of practice can serve as the threshold for test of 
entitlement to claim privileges intended to protect freedom of 
expression and, thus, whether a blogger is so entitled, is a question 
that can be answered under certain United Kingdom and English 
law related to journalistic activities.  These include the Data 
 
 125 See id. at 1410. 
 126 See infra Part IV A. 
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Protection Act 1998127 (‘DPA’) and the qualified privilege in 
defense of defamation.128 
A. Data Protection Act 1998 
The DPA and the secondary legislation promulgated 
thereunder provide advance guidance which uses objective, 
professional ethics criteria as to who benefits under its journalist 
exceptions.  Implementing the European Union Data Protection 
Directive,129 the DPA comprises a scheme of obligations for the 
lawful processing of personal data by those who collect personal 
data and outlines the rights of the personal data subjects.  The 
protections under the Directive and, therefore, the DPA are 
premised on Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention for 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CoE 
Human Rights Convention).130  This protects privacy,131 except as 
lawfully necessary to protect other societal interests such as the 
rights and freedom of others.  The Directive is also premised on 
the European Union’s (EU) internal market powers, which here 
ensure the cross-border flow of such data that is integral to the 
growth of a single market.132  Other interests are also balanced 
 
 127 Data Protection Act, 1998, ch.29 (Eng.). 
 128 See infra Part IV. B. 
 129 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281)31, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/ 
sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31995L0046 
[hereinafter Directive]. 
 130 Council of Europe Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, European Treaty Series No. 005, available at 
http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/echrtext.htm [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights].. 
 131 Id. at art. 8.  Article 8 provides: 
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Id. 
 132 Directive, supra note 129, at art. 1(2). 
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within the EU Directive and the DPA, such as the protection of the 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the CoE Human Rights 
Convention.133  Exceptions are granted for journalists, artists and 
others from some of the obligations applied to other data 
controllers so that they can gather information involving personal 
data.134  The DPA defines “journalism” as one of three “special 
purposes” for which personal data may be processed.  The other 
two special purposes are literary purpose and artistic purpose.135  
Section 32 of the DPA, exempts any person processing data for a 
special purpose from nearly all of the data protection principles 
that govern the processing of personal data, including sensitive 
personal data,136 if: 
(a) the processing is undertaken with a  view to the 
publication by any person of any journalistic, literary or 
artistic material, 
(b) the data controller reasonably believes that, having 
regard in particular to the special importance of the public 
interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in 
the public interest, and 
(c) the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the 
circumstances, compliance with that provision is 
incompatible with the special purposes.137 
The DPA, however, further provides that in determining the 
reasonableness of the belief that publication138 is in the public 
interest under subsection (b), one can consider compliance with 
 
 133 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130, art. 10. 
 134 Directive, supra note 129, at art. 9 (stating that “[m]ember States shall provide for 
exemptions or derogations from the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter 
VI for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the 
purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right 
to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.”). 
 135 See Data Protection Act, 1998, ch.29, § 3 (Eng.). 
 136 See Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Data) Order, 2000, No. 417, sch., ¶ 
3(1)(c) (Eng.). 
 137 Data Protection Act, 1998, § 32(1)(a)-(c) (Eng.). 
 138 “Publish” in connection with “special purposes” processing under the Data 
Protection Act is defined merely as to “make available to the public or any section of the 
public.” Id. at § 32(6). 
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any relevant code of practice applicable for that publication and 
which the Secretary of State has designated for such purposes.139  
The Data Protection (Designated Codes of Practice) Order140 has 
identified five separate codes of practice which may be used: (1) 
the Broadcast Standards Commission’s code, (2) the Independent 
Television Commission code, (3) the Press Complaint 
Commission’s Code of Practice, (4) the BBC Producers’ 
Guidelines, and (5) the Radio Authority’s code.141 
Examining these, the one most likely relevant to bloggers is the 
Press Complaint Commission’s Code of Practice.142  This code is a 
voluntary code developed by the newspaper and periodical 
industry, approved by the Press Complaint Commission (PCC) and 
applies to both “printed and online versions of publications.”143  
Although clearly developed by and with press institutions in mind, 
it does not by its terms or application limit itself to any specific 
press organization or type of publication.144  The PCC’s standards 
govern the newsgathering, verification and dissemination of 
information. They appear to have been amended over time to 
reflect the current human rights legislation and decisions.145  For 
example, a recent change to the PCC prevents all photography of 
people in private places without their consent.  A private place is 
defined as a place that includes both private property and public 
property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.146  A 
place may be private irrespective of whether a long lens was 
 
 139 Id. at § 32(3). 
 140 Data Protection (Designated Codes of Practice) Order, 2000, No. 1864 (Eng.). 
 141 Id.  The Broadcasting Standards Commission, Independent Television Commission 
and the Radio Authority have been subsumed within the Office of Communications 
(Ofcom), the UK regulator for communications industries that includes television and 
radio communications services. See The Radio Authority, 
http://www.radioauthority.org.uk (last visited Jan. 2, 2006). 
 142 CODE OF PRACTICE (Press Complaints Commission 2005), available at 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice: Introduction, 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/intro.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2006); Press Complaints 
Commission, Code of Practice: History of the Code, 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/history.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 146 CODE OF PRACTICE § 3 (Press Complaints Commission 2005), available at 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp. 
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used.147  This provision appears to take into account the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v. 
Germany.148  This provision may require a more precise 
interpretation by the PCC to effect the scope of the private life 
standard in that decision. 
Thus, under the DPA’s use of the PCC codes as an objective 
standard for reasonableness,149 the professional journalistic process 
analysis is built into the public interest balance of privacy and 
freedom of expression.  This does not seem to be precluded by the 
Human Rights Act 1998150 which incorporates much of the 
Council of Europe Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms151 into United Kingdom law and requires 
government officials, including judges, to act in a manner not 
inconsistent with the Convention when they interpret and apply 
laws.152  This, therefore, requires that the freedom of expression, 
protected under Article 10 of the Convention, be considered as a 
separate public interest in interpreting the DPA, which implements 
 
 147 See Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice: History of the Code, 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/history.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2006) (stating that 
amendments made in June 2004 to the privacy provision were intended to cover all 
photography of people in private places regardless of whether a long-lens had been used). 
 148 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2005). 
 149 The PCC Code is not as comprehensive or as strongly worded in some areas, such as 
independence and fair play, as the provisions of other codes. Compare CODE OF PRACTICE 
(Press Complaints Commission 2005), available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp 
(lacking any specific provisions requiring indepdence or fair play) with STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES, arts. III, VI (American Society of Newspaper Editors 2002), available at 
http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm (specifically requiring indepdence and 
fair play).  However, the PCC Code is more comprehensive and strongly worded in 
certain areas, such as privacy, than other codes. Compare CODE OF PRACTICE § 3 (Press 
Complaints Commission 2005), available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp 
(specifically protecting privacy) with CODE OF ETHICS (Society of Professional Journalists 
1996), available at http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp (lacking a provision specifically 
protecting privacy).  For a further discussion of the weaknesses in the PCC Code of 
Practice as an objective standard for balancing conflicting public interests such as privacy 
and freedom of expression, see Part II.A.2.c of this article entitled “Defamation and 
Qualified Privilege.”  For links to various news associations and ethical codes, see 
http://www.asne.org/print.cfm?printer_page=%2Findex%2Ecfm%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fi
d%3D387. 
 150 Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.). 
 151 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130. 
 152 Id. at art. 1. 
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protections stemming from Article 8 of the Convention.153  The 
permitted restrictions on Article 10’s freedom of expression can be 
imposed only pursuant to law and where necessary in a democratic 
society.154  Such restrictions include those arising from the 
responsibilities and duties that arise when the freedom of speech is 
exercised and for the protection of the reputation and the rights of 
others.155  Compliance with a voluntary code of practice that 
restricts the manner in which the press may gather news, including 
those restrictions imposed to protect privacy interests, for 
eligibility for an exemption from the right to privacy under the 
DPA seems to be a proportionate restriction on the freedom of 
expression.  This results seems justified when balanced against the 
potential for harm that might occur from the interference with 
privacy under the exemption which is necessary to ensure access to 
information and its dissemination, as would seem to be required by 
the holding in Campbell v. MGN, Ltd.,156 where the House of 
Lords elaborated the necessary balancing approach required under 
the Human Rights Act 1998. 
B. Defamation and Qualified Privilege 
How a journalistic process test can be applied in the context of 
qualified privilege and using a code of practice can further be seen 
in examining the English law governing defamation.  A privilege is 
recognized as a defense to an allegation of defamation under 
English common law and statute. This privilege applies to 
comments made without malice which were reasonably believed to 
be true concerning matters which the person publishing the 
statements was under a duty to make or had a legitimate interest in 
so doing and the person(s) to whom the statements were made had 
either a duty or a legitimate interest in receiving the statements.157  
Although the privilege applies to everyone, it has been interpreted 
 
 153 Id. at arts. 8, 10. 
 154 Id. at art. 10(2). 
 155 Id. 
 156 [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (balancing articles 8 and 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 140). 
 157 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 164-65 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from C.A.) (quoting Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers, Ltd. [1958] 1 W.L.R. 743, 746-
47). 
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most often in the journalistic context.  There is no privilege that 
attaches purely because the communication relates to information 
regarding political matters, including elections, because personal 
reputations would fail to be protected.  Receiving information 
about political matters is clearly in the public interest and is 
important under the freedom of expression. Despite this, the 
limitations on the qualified privilege that are necessary to protect 
reputation are considered to meet the requirements of necessity for 
encroachments on the exercise of this freedom.158 
In 2001, the House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times 
Newspapers,159 reached this conclusion. It noted that, under the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, journalists have the 
right “to divulge information on issues of general interest provided 
they are acting in good faith and on ‘an accurate factual basis’ and 
supply reliable and precise information in accordance with the 
ethics of journalism” but that “a journalist is not required to 
guarantee the accuracy of his facts.”160  The test for whether the 
qualified privilege attached to the publishing of such information 
without malice fell under the traditional test balancing the interests 
and duties at stake.161  The elasticity of this test enables 
accommodation of freedom of expression interests. The House of 
Lords set a list of ten non-exclusive factors to be considered in 
deciding whether a communication satisfied the test and qualified 
for the privilege.162  These factors also serve as guidance for 
reporters and publishers.  The factors include: 
 
 158 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130, at art. 10(2). 
 159 [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.). 
 160 Id. at 204. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 205. 
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1. The seriousness of the allegation. 
2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which 
the subject matter is a matter of public concern. 
3. The source of the information. 
4. The steps taken to verify the information. 
5. The status of the information, for example, the matter 
may already be under an investigation which 
commands respect. 
6. The urgency of the matter, as news is often a perishable 
commodity. 
7. Whether comment was sought from the claimant, 
although this is not always necessary. 
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s 
side of the story. 
9. The tone of the article, e.g. whether the allegations are 
stated as fact. 
10. The circumstances of the publication, including the 
timing.163 
In applying the factors, each of which are given different 
weights in accordance with the circumstances of each case, the 
House of Lords noted that a court’s decision is made in hindsight 
which is a benefit the reporter does not have.  Thus, the handicap 
of the reporter should be taken into account. Further, the decision 
not to disclose a confidential source should not weigh against the 
 
 163 See id. 
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finding of privilege.  Any “lingering doubts” are to be resolved in 
favor of publication.164 
Thus, the Reynolds court has essentially incorporated the 
journalist process test to balance the duties and the public interest 
at stake.  Clearly, some of these factors would be addressed by 
adherence to the PCC, such as the standards for accurate 
information, the requirement to distinguish between fact and 
comment or conjecture and, possibly the need for a fair 
opportunity to reply to inaccuracies. Others would be met by a 
code with more rigor.  For example, the Society of Professional 
Journalists’ Code of Ethics requires that journalists (1) diligently 
seek comment from the subject regarding allegations of misdoing, 
(2) question the motive of sources seeking anonymity, (3) test the 
accuracy of information from all sources and (4) avoid 
advocacy.165  Were the PCC, or an individual publication including 
a blogger, to enhance its operating standards to include some of 
these other standards imposed by the Society of Professional 
Journalists’ Code of Ethics, compliance with such enhanced code 
would be likely to ensure that journalistic privilege would attach 
because the publication would likely satisfy the balancing test of 
the duties and the public interest.  Under the Reynolds test, the 
court must evaluate the content of the communication for its 
subject matter with more weight accorded to political or other 
purely public matters under the freedom of expression balance. 
CONCLUSION 
The journalistic process test is a valuable and workable test to 
determine when one is functioning as a journalist no matter what 
label is applied to the person’s employment or publication 
medium. It can be implemented practically by requiring a showing 
of customary adherence to a code of journalist professionalism. 
This would establish that a person followed acceptable and 
recognized journalistic processes for gathering, evaluating, 
 
 164 Id. 
 165 CODE OF ETHICS (Society of Professional Journalists 1996), available at 
http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2005). 
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validating and publishing information.  Professional codes could, 
therefore, be used as the journalist process test for granting special 
protections and privileges accorded in the interest of freedom of 
expression such as those recognized under the U.S. First 
Amendment and statutory shield laws and common law 
protections.  This is a workable scheme that appears to 
accommodate varying scopes of protection or privilege,166 
although statutory language might need to be amended to 
accommodate it.  With an absolute privilege, for example, it could 
serve of itself to verify valid journalist status.  Here, as well, a 
person might be considered to have ‘earned’ the privilege 
addressing some views of links to press responsibility.  For 
qualified privileges, the test could be used as a first step together 
with those other criteria, in statutes or developed by courts, to 
balance the competing interests.  Compliance with objective 
professional standards evinces considerable intent and procedural 
steps to ensure that the facts communicated were of greater validity 
than disinformation and mere rumor and could further assist in the 
balance.  The United Kingdom experience demonstrates this.  It 
has, without enunciating such a test, effectively put a journalist 
process test into practice in certain statutes and decisions.  The 
DPA scheme uses a publishers’ code of professional practice to 
balance whether according the privilege to limit privacy rights is 
reasonable.  Because neither the DPA nor the qualified defamation 
privilege are limited to a particular entity, industry or status but 
rather apply to any ‘person’, the de jure process analysis of the 
United Kingdom’s DPA and the de facto process analysis of the 
English common law privilege in Reynolds permit such freedom of 
expression protections to encompass many types of media outlets, 
as appropriate.  These can include the evolving and more 
participatory media, such as “blogs,” that the Internet and other 
convergences have and are likely to produce. Such approach in the 
United Kingdom appears to provide the flexibility to balance the 
 
 166 For example, customary adherence to a code of academic integrity could likely serve 
to identify the non-journalist scholar whose writing these days might be published in 
blog, an online journal or a traditional publication. See, e.g., George Washington 
University, Code of Academic Integrity, available at: http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~ntegrity/code.html#repeal. 
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competing interests under Council of Europe Convention for 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that the 
United Kingdom is required to address.  This approach would also 
accord the flexibility and the ability to incorporate different 
national or other professional standards that reflect the differing 
rights and sensibilities of each country as well as the possibility 
that individual bloggers or organizations could follow higher 
ethical standards.  This suggests that it is a test that the United 
States could readily adapt to its own public interest balance 
whether under the First Amendment, common law and specific 
statutes affecting public communications.  Congress should 
seriously consider this approach in any future debate for a federal 
shield law. 
 
